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Introduction
In this paper we present a general method for solving optimal insider games, i.e. optimal insider games problems where the players has access to some future information about the system. This inside information in the control processes puts the problem outside the context of semimartingale theory, and we therefore apply general anticipating white noise calculus, including forward integrals and Hida-Malliavin calculus. Combining this with the Donsker delta functional for the random variable Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) which represents the inside information, we are able to prove both a sufficient and a necessary maximum principle for the optimal insider games of such systems.
for all t, where Y i is a given F T 0 -measurable random variable, for some fixed T 0 > T > t. Here the insider control process u(t) = (u 1 (t), u 2 (t)), where u i (t) is the control of player i; i=1,2. Thus we assume that the value at time t of our insider control process u i (t) is allowed to depend on both Y i and F t ; i = 1, 2. In other words, u i is assumed to be H i -adapted for i = 1, 2. Therefore they have the form
for some function u i : [0, T ] × R × Ω → R such that u i (t, y i ) is F-adapted for each y i ∈ R.
For simplicity (albeit with some abuse of notation) we will in the following write u i in stead of u i ; i = 1, 2. Consider a controlled stochastic process X(t) = X u (t) of the form    dX(t) = dX u (t) = b(t, X(t), u 1 (t), u 2 (t), Y 1 , Y 2 )dt + σ(t, X(t), u 1 (t), u 2 (t), Y 1 , Y 2 )dB(t) + R γ(t, X(t), u 1 (t), u 2 (t), Y 1 , Y 2 , ζ)Ñ(dt, dζ); t ≥ 0 X(0) = x(Y ) ∈ R, (1.3) {eq2.1} where u i (t) = u i (t, y i ) y i =Y i is the control process of insider i; i = 1, 2, and the (anticipating) stochastic integrals are interpreted as forward integrals, as introduced in [RV] (Brownian motion case) and in [DMØP1] (Poisson random measure case). A motivation for using forward integrals in the modelling of insider control is given in [BØ] . Let A i denote a given set of admissible H i −adapted controls u i of player i, with values in A i ⊂ R d , d ≥ 1; i = 1, 2. Denote U = A 1 × A 2 . Then X(t) is F ∨ Y 1 ∨ Y 2 -adapted. The performance functional J i (u); u = (u 1 , u 2 ) of player i is defined by, writing y = (y 1 , y 2 ) and dy = dy 1 dy 2 ,
f i (t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), u 1 (t, y 1 ), u 2 (t, y 2 ), y)E[δ Y 1 ,Y 2 (y 1 , y 2 )|F t ]dt + g i (x(T, y 1 , y 2 ), y 1 , y 2 )E[δ Y 1 ,Y 2 (y 1 , y 2 )|F T ]}dy]; i = 1, 2.
(1.4)
A Nash equilibrium for the game (3.3)-(3.8) is a pairû = (û 1 ,û 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 such that sup u 1 ∈A 1 J 1 (u 1 ,û 2 ) ≤ J 1 (û 1 ,û 2 ) (1.5) {eq2.10} and sup u 2 ∈A 2 J 2 (û 1 , u 2 ) ≤ J 2 (û 1 ,û 2 ).
(1.6) {eq2.11}
We use the Donsker delta functional of Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) to find a Nash equilibrium for the game (3.3)-(3.8).
Here is an outline of the content of the paper:
• In Section 2 we define the Donsker delta functional.
• In Section 3 we present the general insider optimal control problem for the stochastic differential games.
• In Sections 4 and 5 we present a sufficient and a necessary maximum principle, respectively, for the insider game problem.
• In Section 6 we present the zero-sum game case where we distinguish two situations: Situation 1: Both players are still maximizing their own performance functional and situation 2: One of the players is maximizing and the other is minimizing the performance functional and we write the sufficient and necessary maximum principle corresponding for each situation.
• Then in Section 7 we illustrate our results by applying them to optimal insider consumption and optimal insider portfolio under model uncertainty.
2 The Donsker delta functional
: Ω 2 → R be a pair of random variables which also belongs to (S) * 2 . Then a continuous functional
is called a Donsker delta functional of (Y 1 , Y 2 ) if it has the property that
for all (measurable) g : R 2 → R such that the integral converges.
For more information about the Donsker delta function and some explicit formulas for it, see [DrØ] .
3 The general insider optimal control problem for the stochastic differential games
In this section, we formulate and prove a sufficient and a necessary maximum principle for general stochastic differential games (not necessarily zero-sum games) for insiders. The system we consider, is described by a stochastic differential equation driven by a Brownian motion B(t) and an independent compensated Poisson random measureÑ(dt, dζ), jointly defined on a filtered probability space (Ω, F = {F t } t≥0 , P) satisfying the usual conditions. We assume that the inside information is of initial enlargement type. Specifically, we assume that the two inside filtrations H 1 , H 2 representing the information flows available to player 1 and player 2, respectively, have the form
for all t, where Y i is a given F T -measurable random variable, for some fixed T > t. Here the insider control process u(t) = (u 1 (t), u 2 (t)), where u i (t) is the control of player i; i=1,2. Thus we assume that the value at time t of our insider control process u i (t) is allowed to depend on both Y i and F t ; i = 1, 2. In other words, u i is assumed to be H i -adapted for i = 1, 2. Therefore they have the form
For simplicity (albeit with some abuse of notation) we will in the following write u i in stead of u i ; i = 1, 2. Consider a controlled stochastic process
3) {eq2.1} where u i (t) = u i (t, y i ) y i =Y i is the control process of insider i; i = 1, 2, and the (anticipating) stochastic integrals are interpreted as forward integrals, as introduced in [RV] (Brownian motion case) and in [DMØP1] (Poisson random measure case). A motivation for using forward integrals in the modelling of insider control is given in [BØ] . Let A i denote a given set of admissible H i −adapted controls u i of player i, with values in
, and hence using the definition of the Donsker delta functional δ Y 1 ,Y 2 (y 1 , y 2 ) of (Y 1 , Y 2 ) we get
for some y 1 , y 2 -parametrized process x(t, y 1 , y 2 ) which is F-adapted for each y 1 , y 2 . Then, again by the definition of the Donsker delta functional and the properties of forward inte-gration ( [DrØ] ), we can write
Comparing (3.4) and (3.5) we see that (3.4) holds if we choose x(t, y) for each y = (y 1 , y 2 ) as the solution of the classical SDE dx(t, y 1 , y 2 ) = b(t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), u 1 (t, y 1 ), u 2 (t, y 2 ), y 1 , y 2 )dt + σ(t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), u 1 (t, y 1 ), u 2 (t, y 2 ), y 1 , y 2 )dB(t)
The performance functional J i (u); u = (u 1 , u 2 ) of player i is defined by
A Nash equilibrium for the game (3.3)-(3.8) is a pairû = (û 1 ,û 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 such that sup
and sup
4 A sufficient maximum principle
The problem (3.9)-(3.10) is a stochastic differential game with a standard (albeit parametrized) stochastic differential equation (3.6) for the state process x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), but with a non-standard performance functional given by (3.8). We can solve this problem by a modified maximum principle approach, as follows:
Here R denotes the set of all functions r(.) : R → R such that the last integral above converges. For i = 1, 2 we define the adjoint processes p i (t, y 1 , y 2 ), q i (t, y 1 , y 2 ), r i (t, y 1 , y 2 , ζ) as the solution of the y 1 , y 2 -parametrised BSDEs
Then we see that
To study this problem we present two maximum principles for the corresponding games. The first is the following:
of (3.6) and (4.2); i=1,2. Assume that the following hold:
2. The functionŝ
(4.7) and
for all t, y 1 .
(4.9)
Then (u * 1 (., y 1 ), u * 2 (., y 2 )) := ( u 1 (., y 1 ), u 2 (., y 2 )) is a Nash equilibrium for the problem (4.5)-(4.6).
Proof.
By considering an increasing sequence of stopping times τ n converging to T , we may assume that all local integrals appearing in the computations below are martingales and have expectation 0. We omit the details in this argument. See [ØS2] . We first prove that
Choose arbitrary u 1 (., y 1 ) ∈ A 1 and let us in the following, for simplicity of notation, put
and similarly with σ(t, y 1 , y 2 ),σ(t, y 1 , y 2 ), γ(t, y 1 , y 2 , ζ),γ(t, y 1 , y 2 , ζ) andx(t, y 1 , y 2 ) = x(t, y 1 , y 2 )− x(t, y 1 , y 2 ). Let us also put H 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ) = H 1 (t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), y 1 , y 2 , u 1 (t, y 1 ),û 2 (t, y 2 ), p 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ), q 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ),r 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 , ·)) (4.12) and
(4.14) {I_1}
and
By the definition of H 1 we have
Since g 1 is concave we have
Adding (4.16) -(4.17) we get, by concavity of
SinceĤ 1 (x) is concave, it follows by a standard separating hyperplane argument that there exists a supergradient a ∈ R forĤ 1 (x) at x =x(t, y 1 , y 2 ) such that if we define
On the other hand, we clearly have
2 ),p(t, y 1 , y 2 ),q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ζ)dy 2 = a (4.22) Combining this with (4.18), we get
4.1 The case when only one of the players is an insider.
It is useful also to have a formulation in the partly degenerate case when only one of the players, say player number 1, has inside information. Then the control of player 1 is H 1 -adapted as before, while player 2 is F-adapted. In this case we define the Hamiltonians
Here, as before, R denotes the set of all functions r(.) : R → R such that the last integral above converges. For i = 1, 2 we define the adjoint processes p i (t, y 1 ), q i (t, y 1 ), r i (t, y 1 , ζ) as the solution of the y 1 -parametrised BSDEs dp i (t,
Let J i (u(., y 1 )) be defined by
(4.27) {eq2.37}
Theorem 4.3 [Sufficient maximum principle with only one insider] Suppose Y 2 = 0, i.e. player number 2 has no inside information. Let (û 1 ,û 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 with associated solutionx(t, y 1 ),p i (t, y 1 ),q i (t, y 1 ),r i (t, y 1 , ζ) of (3.6) and (4.2); i=1,2. Assume that the following hold:
are concave for all t.
3.
Then (u * 1 (., y 1 ), u * 2 (.)) := ( u 1 (., y 1 ), u 2 (.)) is a Nash equilibrium for the problem (4.5)-(4.6).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2 and is omitted.
A necessary maximum principle
We proceed to establish a corresponding necessary maximum principle. For this, we do not need concavity conditions, but in stead we need the following assumptions about the set of admissible control values:
• A 1 . For all t 0 ∈ [0, T ], y i ∈ R and all bounded F t 0 -measurable random variables
• A 2 . For all
and put
Then there exists δ > 0 such that the control
belongs to A i for all a ∈ (−δ, δ) for i = 1, 2.
• A3. For all β i as in (5.2) the derivative processes
exists, and belong to L 2 (λ × P) and
Theorem 5.1 [Necessary maximum principle] Let (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 . Then the following are equivalent:
J 2 (u 1 , u 2 + aβ 2 )| a=0 dy 1 dy 2 = 0 for all bounded β i ∈ A i of the form (5.2).
2.
[ R ∂H 1 ∂v 1 (t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), v 1 , u 2 (t, y 2 ), p 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ), q 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ), r 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 , .))dy 2 ] v 1 =u 1 (t,y 1 )
Proof.
By considering an increasing sequence of stopping times τ n converging to T , we may assume that all local integrals appearing in the computations below are martingales and have expectation 0. See [ØS2] . We can write
By our assumptions on f 1 and g 1 and by (4.2) we have
By the Itô formula
χ 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 )dp 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ) +
p 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ){ ∂b ∂x (t, y 1 , y 2 )χ 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 ) + ∂b ∂u 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 )β 1 (t, y 1 )}dt (5.9)
Summing (5.7) and (5.9) we get
we conclude that
for all bounded β 1 ∈ A 1 of the form (5.2).
Changing the order of integration we can write this as follows:
where
In particular, applying this to β 1 (t, y 1 ) = θ 1 (t, y 1 ) as in A1, we get that this is again equivalent to
Since F 1 (t, y 1 ) is already F t -adapted, we have
So we deduce that F 1 (t, y 1 ) = R ∂H 1 ∂u 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 )dy 2 = 0, ∀t, y 1 .
A similar argument gives that
The zero-sum game case
In the zero-sum case we have R R J 1 (u 1 (., y 1 ), u 2 (., y 2 )) + J 2 (u 1 (., y 1 ), u 2 (., y 2 ))dy 1 dy 2 = 0. (6.1)
Then the Nash equilibrium (û 1 (., y 1 ),û 2 (., y 2 )) ∈ A 1 × A 2 satisfying (4.5)-(4.6) becomes a saddle point for
To see this, note that (4.5)-(4.6) imply that
and hence
J(û 1 (., y 1 ), u 2 (., y 2 ))dy 1 dy 2 (6.4) for all u 1 , u 2 . From this we deduce that
(6.5)
Since we always have inf sup ≥ sup inf, we conclude that
J(u 1 (., y 1 ), u 2 (., y 2 ))dy 1 dy 2 (6.6)
i.e (û 1 (., y 1 ),û 2 (., y 2 )) ∈ A 1 ×A 2 is a saddle point for R R J(u 1 (., y 1 ), u 2 (., y 2 ))dy 1 dy 2 . Hence we want to find (û 1 (., y 1 ),û 2 (., y 2 )) ∈ A 1 × A 2 such that sup
6.1 Situation 1: Both players are still maximising their own performance functional
Choose g 1 = g = −g 2 and f 1 = f = −f 2 . Then by (6.12) the Hamiltonians are:
and H 2 (t, x, y 1 , y 2 , u 1 , u 2 , p, q, r) = H 2 (t, x, y 1 , y 2 , u 1 , u 2 , p, q, r, ω)
Let p i , q i , r i , i = 1, 2 be as in (4.2). Let us now state the necessary maximum principle for the zero sum game problem:
Theorem 6.1 [Necessary maximum principle for zero-sum games] Assume the conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold. Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 5.1
Situation 2: One of the players is maximising and the other is minimising the performance functional
Let us now look at the problem with one performance functional common to both players, but where one of the players is maximising and the other is minimising it. Then we get just one Hamiltonian and just one BSDE, which is simpler to deal with. In this case the Hamiltonian H, is given by:
Moreover, there is only one triple (p, q, r) of adjoint processes, given by the BSDE dp(t, y 1 , y 2 ) = − ∂H ∂x
(6.13) {eq4.12} We can now state the corresponding sufficient maximum principle for the zero-sum game:
Theorem 6.2 (Sufficient maximum principle for the zero-sum game)
Let (û 1 ,û 2 ) ∈ A 1 ×A 2 with associated solutionx(t, y 1 , y 2 ),p(t, y 1 , y 2 ),q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ζ) of (3.6) and (6.13). Assume that the following holds:
1. the function x → g(x) is affine 2. sup u 1 ∈A 1 R H t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), u 1 ,û 2 (t, y 2 ), p(t, y 1 , y 2 ), q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ·) dy 2 = R H t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ), u 1 (t, y 1 ),û 2 (t, y 2 ), p(t, y 1 , y 2 ), q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ·) dy 2 for all t, y 1 .
(6.14) inf u 2 ∈A 2 R H t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ),û 1 (t, y 1 ), u 2 , p(t, y 1 , y 2 ), q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ·) dy 1 = R H t, x(t, y 1 , y 2 ),û 1 (t, y 1 ),û 2 (t, y 2 ), p(t, y 1 , y 2 ), q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ·) dy 1 for all t, y 2 .
(6.15)
The function
H(x) = sup u 1 ∈A 1 R H(t, x, y 1 , y 2 , u 1 ,û 2 (t, y 2 ), p(t, y 1 , y 2 ), q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ·))dy 2 (6.16) is concave for all t, y 1 , and the function
H(t, x, y 1 , y 2 ,û 1 (t, y 1 ), u 2 , p(t, y 1 , y 2 ), q(t, y 1 , y 2 ),r(t, y 1 , y 2 , ·))dy 1 (6.17) is convex for all t, y 2 .
Thenû(t, y 1 , y 2 ) = (û 1 (t, y 1 ),û 2 (t, y 2 )) is a saddle point for J(u 1 , u 2 ).
Let us now state the necessary maximum principle for the zero sum game problem:
Theorem 6.3 [Necessary maximum principle for zero-sum games] Assume the conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold. Then the following are equivalent: (6.18) 7 Applications
Optimal insider consumption under model uncertainty
Suppose we have a cash flow with consumption, modelled by the process X(t, Y ) = X c,µ (t, Y ) defined by:
Here α(t, Y ), β(t, Y ), γ(t, Y ) are given coefficients, while c(t, Y 1 ) > 0 is the relative consumption rate chosen by the consumer (player number 1) and µ(t, Y 2 ) is a perturbation of the drift term, representing the model uncertainty chosen by the environment (player number 2). Define the performance functional by
where θ > 0 is a given constant and 1 2 µ 2 (t) represents a penalty rate, penalizing µ for being away from 0. We assume that c is H 1 -adapted, while µ is H 2 -adapted. We want to find c * ∈ A 1 and µ * ∈ A 2 such that
As before we rewrite this problem as a classical stochastic differential game with two parameters y 1 , y 2 . Thus we define, for y = (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ R × R,
The Hamiltonian for this problem is H(t, x, y, c, µ, p, q, r) 7.5) and the BSDE for the adjoint processes p, q, r is
Define h(t, y) = p(t, y)x(t, y).
Then by the Itô formula we get
To simplify this, we define the process k(t, y) by the equation
for suitable processes b, c (to be determined). Then again by the Itô formula we get
h(t, y)γ(t, y, ζ) + x(t, y)r(t, y, ζ)(1 + γ(t, y, ζ) k(t, y)c(t, y, ζ)dν(ζ)dt (7.12) {eq0.12}
Define u(t, y) := h(t, y)k(t, y).
(7.13) {eq0.13}
Then the equation above can be written
Then (7.14) reduces to
+ k(t, y)x(t, y)q(t, y)b(t, y) + k(t, y) R x(t, y)r(t, y, ζ)c(t, y, ζ)(1 + γ(t, y, ζ))dν(ζ)
Now define v(t, y) := k(t, y)x(t, y)q(t, y) w(t, y) := k(t, y)x(t, y)r(t, y, ζ).
Then from (7.12) and (7.15) we get the following BSDE in the unknowns u, v, w: This is a linear BSDE which has a unique solution u(t, y) = p(t, y)x(t, y)k(t, y), v(t, y), w(t, y, ζ).
In particular, we may regard p(t, y)x(t, y) = u(t, y) k(t, y) We can now verify thatĉ,μ satisfies all the conditions of the sufficient maximum principle, and hence we conclude the following: where h(t, y) = x(t, y)p(t, y) is given by (7.19)-(7.20).
Optimal insider portfolio under model uncertainty
Consider a financial market with two investment possibilities:
• (i) A risk free investment possibility with unit price S 0 (t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ]
• (ii) A risky investment, where the unit price S(t) = S(t, Y ) is modelled by the (forward) SDE dS(t, Y ) = S(t, Y )[(α(t, Y ) + µ(t))dt + β(t, Y )dB(t)]; S(0) > 0. (7.27) {eq00.1}
Here α(t, Y ), β(t, Y ) are given H-adapted coefficients, while µ(t) is a perturbation of the drift term, representing the model uncertainty chosen by the environment (player number 2). Suppose the wealth process X(t, Y ) = X π,µ (t, Y ) associated to an insider portfolio π(t, Y ) (representing the fraction of the wealth invested in the risky asset) is given by: where θ(T, Y ) > 0 is a given H T -measurable random variable, and 1 2 µ 2 (t) represents a penalty rate, penalizing µ for being away from 0. We assume that π is H-adapted, while µ is F-adapted, i.e. has no inside information.
We want to find π * ∈ A 1 and µ * ∈ A 2 such that We rewrite this problem as a classical stochastic differential game with one parameter y 1 = y ∈ R. Thus we define dx(t, y) = π(t, y)x(t, y)[{α(t, y) + µ(t)}dt + β(t, y)dB(t)] x(0, y) = x(y) > 0 (7.31) {eq00.5}
and J(π(., y), µ(.)) = E[ The Hamiltonian for this problem is H(t, x, y, π, µ, p, q) = 1 2 µ 2 E[δ Y (y)|F t ] + πx(α(t, y) + µ)p + πxβ(t, y)q (7.33) {eq00.7}
and the BSDE for the adjoint processes p, q is Minimizing R Hdy with respect to µ gives the following first order equation for the optimalμ(t):
